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The Keeneye Case: Rethinking the Content of 
Public Policy in Cross-Border Arbitration 
Between Hong Kong and Mainland China

Weixia Gu and Xianchu Zhang*
A recent decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Gao Haiyan v 
Keeneye Holdings Ltd considers public policy-based procedural objections in the 
context of enforcement of a mainland China arbitration award that was made 
following the hybrid process of mediation and arbitration (med-arb). This article 
attempts to decipher what this case means to Hong Kong and the cross-border 
arbitral relations. What has changed in the playing fi eld of public policy in the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in Hong Kong and what can parties expect of 
Hong Kong courts on public policy issues in treating Mainland arbitral awards 
after the Keeneye case? In light of the rising use of med-arb procedures, this article 
studies particularly the novel issue of public policy of enforcing med-arb awards, 
and analyses how the different legal practices in Hong Kong and mainland China 
may cause much uncertainty in the cross-border enforcement arena. It is revealed 
that even after unifi cation for more than 15 years there are legal as well as ideo-
logical confl icts between the two sides. Although the Keeneye case may have, 
on the one hand, lowered the predictability of outcome in cases which involve a 
cross-border clash in ideology in the enforcement of arbitral awards, it has simul-
taneously acted as a catalyst in reducing such differences, as seen from the rapid 
Mainland reform to the rules on med-arb. In the long run, a potentially more 
credible Chinese arbitration system is expected to be built upon and in the course 
of its improvement, understanding from the Hong Kong side will be helpful for the 
healthy development of a cross-border arbitration scheme. 
I. Introduction
Arbitration has been a popular means of dispute resolution for handling 
foreign business in both mainland China ("the Mainland") and Hong Kong.1 
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is Professor and Associate Dean at the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. The authors 
are grateful to Anson Douglas for his capable research assistance in preparing the draft of this 
article. The research is fi nancially supported by China National Social Science Research Fund 
(Project Code 11BFX143) and University of Hong Kong Small Projects Grant (Project Code 
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1 According to the Working Report of CIETAC, foreign-related arbitration cases it accepted 
reached the record high in 2009 to 559 and in 2010, all 209 arbitration commissions in 
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Cross-border recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards between the 
two jurisdictions can be traced back to 1989 when the fi rst award made by 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (the 
“CIETAC”) in Beijing was enforced in Hong Kong and approximately 
150 mainland China arbitral awards were recognised in Hong Kong 
according to the 1958 United Nations Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).2 
Hong Kong has been a member of the Convention since 1977, when the 
United Kingdom extended its application to Hong Kong. In 1987, the 
People’s Republic of China became signatory to the Convention, and 
upon the handover on 1 July 1997, China extended the application of 
the Convention to Hong Kong.3 With respect to cross-border arbitration 
post the hand-over, the Supreme People’s Court of the Mainland and the 
Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(the “SAR”) effectively signed an Arrangement on Mutual Enforcement 
of Arbitral awards (the “Arrangement”) between each other under the 
“one country, two systems” principle in June 1999.4 
Although the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR explicitly provides 
that the SAR may, through consultation and in accordance with the Basic 
Law, maintain judicial relations with the judicial organs of other parts of 
the Mainland and render assistance to each other,5 the lack of implemen-
tation details took both sides two years to work out the Arrangement 
in 1999 as the new legal basis to replace the old landscape set up by 
the 1958 New York Convention. The Arrangement basically main-
tained the principles and rules of the New York Convention for refusal 
of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and Art 7 explicitly 
provides public policy as a legal ground to refuse enforcement request 
from the other side.6 This provision was later codifi ed into the Hong 
Kong Arbitration Ordinance.7 Up to June 2011, more than 90 Mainland 
mainland China accepted 1219 foreign-related arbitration cases. Information collected from 
Newsletters of CIETAC from its web site at http://cn.cietac.org/newsletter/newsletter.asp.
2 Xianchu Zhang, “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Mainland China and Hong Kong: 
Before and After Reunifi cation”, in Raymond Wacks (eds), The New Legal Order in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp 192–196.
3 China has made two reservations when agreeing to the New York Convention. First, it only 
recognises awards made by member states of the Convention; second, it only applies the 
Convention provisions to confl icts arising from legal relationships, whether contractual or not, 
that are considered commercial under PRC law.
4 The full text of the Arrangement is available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/
eng/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf. 
5 Article 95 of the Basic Law.
6 Article 7 of the Arrangement; see also Xianchu Zhang, “The Arrangement between Mainland 
China and the Hong Kong SAR on Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Problems and 
Prospects” (1999) 29 HKLJ 463–485. 
7 Section 95(3) of Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609). 
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arbitral awards, including not only CIETAC’s but also many other made 
by local arbitration commissions, were recognised and enforced in Hong 
Kong.8 On the other hand, from 2000 to 2008, at least 24 arbitral awards 
made in Hong Kong were executed in the Mainland by Chinese people’s 
courts.9
Despite the encouraging progress, the signifi cant disparities in legal 
tradition and rule of law development between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland have given rise to controversies of the cross-border legal coop-
eration on commercial matters with public policy as a focal point.10 Thus 
far, in the context of enforcement of cross-border arbitral awards, pub-
lic policy issues have been disputed in a number of cases. Claims under 
this ground are particularly easy to make. As Hong Kong and mainland 
China obviously hold on to different legal standards and principles, an 
arbitration which has been conducted according to Mainland standards 
may be impeached by applying a more stringent common law standard 
in Hong Kong. 
For reasons of comity between the two jurisdictions and the unrea-
sonableness of requiring Mainland arbitrations to adhere to the strict 
standards of Hong Kong law, Hong Kong courts have long since closely 
scrutinised all public policy claims, and have placed a high threshold of 
requiring the alleged infringement to be fundamental to Hong Kong’s 
fundamental sense of justice and morality.11 While the high threshold 
set by Hong Kong courts may have acted as a potent disincentive against 
frivolous claims on public policy, and to protect the operation of the arbi-
tration systems, both in Hong Kong and with the Mainland, it seems that 
the bar has been set so high that parties subject to irregular awards with 
genuine issues of public policy are fi nding it diffi cult to avail themselves 
of the public policy exception to enforcement.
A most recent decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal consid-
ers public policy-based procedural objections in the context of enforce-
ment of a Mainland award that was made following the hybrid process 
of mediation and arbitration (the “med-arb”). Gao Haiyan v Keeneye 
Holdings Ltd (the “Keeneye case”),12 decided by the Court of Appeal in 
early December 2011, where the appeal against the ruling of the High 
 8 Information collected from the web site of Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre.
 9 Document of Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services of the Legislative Council 
of Hong Kong SAR, CB (2) 1129/10-11(01), Feb 2011, paras 5-6 (in Chinese).
10 Gu Weixia, “Recourse against Arbitral Awards: How Far Can a Court Go? Supportive and 
Supervisory Role of Hong Kong Courts as Lessons to Mainland China Arbitration” (2005) 
2 Chinese Journal of International Law 481–500.
11 Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (1999) 2 HKCFAR 111.
12 Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd [2012] 1 HKLRD 627.
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Court was allowed,13 represents the latest development on the ground of 
public policy.14
This article attempts to decipher what this case means to Hong Kong 
in cross-border arbitral relations. What has changed to the playing fi eld 
of public policy in the enforcement of arbitral awards in Hong Kong 
and what can parties expect of Hong Kong courts on public policy issues 
in treating Mainland arbitral awards, after the Keeneye case? In light of 
the rising use of med-arb procedures in mainland China, this article will 
focus particularly on the novel issue of the public policy of enforcing 
med-arb awards, and how the different cross-border legal practices may 
cause much uncertainty in the enforcement arena. 
To discuss these issues, this article is structured into fi ve parts. Following 
this introduction, in Section II, the Keeneye case is briefl y described, and 
the problems it poses in the cross-border enforcement will be pointed 
out. Section III explains the ground of public policy in enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, and its treatment internationally will be anal-
ysed. This section will also include a case review on how the Hong Kong 
courts have treated public policy in screening foreign arbitral awards, par-
ticularly awards from the Mainland, over the past 20 years. Section IV 
evaluates the new playing fi eld of public policy brought by the med-arb 
procedure—its system, its rising signifi cance and problems. Section V 
evaluates the impact of Keeneye case on cross-border arbitral relations 
before the article ends with a conclusion in Section VI. It is revealed that 
there are legal as well as ideological gaps between the two jurisdictions. 
Although the Keeneye case may have, on the one hand, lowered the pre-
dictability of outcome in cases which involve a cross-border clash in ide-
ology in the enforcement of arbitral awards, it has simultaneously acted 
as a catalyst in reducing such differences, as seen from the rapid Mainland 
reform to the rules. In the long run, a potentially more credible Chinese 
arbitration system is expected to be built upon and in the course of its 
improvement, understanding from the Hong Kong side will be helpful for 
the health development of a cross-border arbitration scheme. 
II.  The Keeneye Case
On 12 April 2011, Reyes J delivered his judgment in the Court of First 
Instance (the “CFI”), denying the enforcement of a Mainland arbitral 
13 [2011] 3 HKC 157.
14 Robert Morgan and Man Sin Yeung, “Enforcement of Foreign and Mainland Arbitral Awards 
in Hong Kong: Med-Arb, Public Policy and Waiver” (2012) Asian Dispute Review 28–31.
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award by reason that it infringed Hong Kong’s public policy, by being 
made under circumstances indicating apparent bias.15 
The Keeneye case arose out of a dispute concerning the validity of 
two share transfer agreements made between the parties. The reason for 
the refusal by the CFI to allow enforcement of the award in Hong Kong 
arose from alleged procedural defects in a mediation conducted as part 
of the arbitration process, ie med-arb.16 The bias was found to arise from 
a private meeting between an arbitrator nominated by the applicants 
and the Secretary General of the Xi’an Arbitration Commission (the 
“XAC”) and an affi liate of the respondents, who was told to “work on” 
an RMB 250 million proposal with the respondents in the med-arb pro-
cess. The respondents eventually refused to pay the proposed settlement 
and proceeded to arbitration. The arbitral award amounted to RMB 50 
million only.17 
The Arbitration Rules of the XAC make express provision for med-arb. 
Article 37 of the Rules provides that the med-arb should be conducted 
“by the arbitral tribunal or the presiding arbitrator”, although it goes on 
to say that “with the approval of the parties, any third party may be 
invited to assist the mediation, or they may act as mediator”.18 After the 
award was made, the respondents appealed to the Xi’an Intermediate 
Court to set aside the award, alleging bias and breaches of the XAC’s 
arbitral rules on proper procedure of med-arb. The case was later dis-
missed by the Xi’an court, which stated that there was no evidence of 
bias and no breach of the arbitral rules, and upheld the award. It stated 
that the private meeting was validly held as a part of an agreement to the 
med-arb process.19 
As the presiding judge in the CFI trial, Reyes J refused to follow the 
decision of the Xi’an Court, deciding that to enforce the award would 
breach Hong Kong’s public policy. Although the Xi’an Court found the 
award to be perfectly valid by its standards, Reyes J held that Hong Kong 
courts could apply its own standards when deciding whether an award is 
to be refused enforcement under public policy grounds. He further held 
that a med-arb process may run into self-evident diffi culties from the 
point of view of impartiality and the risk of apparent bias arising from 
15 See n 14 above. For the procedural history of the case, see also Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings 
Ltd (unrep., HCCT 41/2011, 8 November 2010) (Saunders J).
16 The Med-Arb process will be explained more completely later in this article, but in short, it is 
a process where the parties agree to mediate their dispute within the process of arbitration. 
17 See n 16 above.
18 Article 37 of the Rules of the XAC.
19 See n 16 above.
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an arbitrator also acting as mediator.20 Under the principle that “justice 
has to be done and also seen to be done”, he concluded that the private 
meeting, while insuffi cient to prove actual bias, when combined with 
the contrasting result of the RMB 50 million and the proposed RMB 
250 million settlement during mediation, can lead to a “reasonable 
bystander to apprehend bias as a real possibility in the making of the 
award”.21
However, upon appeal, Tang VP, Fok JA and Sakhrani J at the Court 
of Appeal (the “CA”) unanimously allowed the appeal and reinstated 
the award.22 They stressed and reapplied the usual strict policy of disal-
lowing the refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards except in the most 
exceptional circumstance of cases.23 They disagreed to Reyes J’s fi nding 
of apparent bias, and surprisingly, also held that although Hong Kong 
can apply its own public policy when deciding whether an award is to 
be enforced, deference should also be had to the fact that the super-
vising court had previously found that there was no fi nding of bias and 
that the med-arb process was properly proceeded with according to their 
standards. While the CA came to this conclusion based on the under-
standable principles of fi nality of arbitration and comity of cross-border 
arbitration, its application is somewhat controversial. The CA’s decision 
was questioned whether it has lowered its standards too far in the court’s 
usual policy of refusing to enforce biased awards, in order to protect the 
vibrancy of the cross-border arbitration system.24 Thus far, the Keeneye 
case has not been further appealed.
III. Public Policy in Hong Kong
III.1. Public Policy and its Treatment Internationally
The origin of the public policy ground for refusing enforcement of an 
arbitral award arises from the New York Convention. Article V 2(b) of 
the Convention provides that recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award may be refused if “it would be contrary to the public policy of 
that country”.25 Although the words “of that country” clearly bear the 
20 See n 14 above, at para 72.
21 Ibid.
22 See n 12 above.
23 The authority of this principle is in the CFA case of Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek 
Engineering Co Ltd (n 11 above).
24 For a general review of the criticism of the case, see Phillip Georgiou, “The Real Risk of Bias in 
‘Chinese Style’ Arbitrations” (2011) Asian Dispute Review 89. 
25 Article V 2(b) of the Convention.
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meaning that the public policy in question refers to that of the particular 
jurisdiction under which the enforcing court is acting, there has been 
much argument on whether this public policy should adhere to an 
accepted international standard, or the standard of the lex arbitri, instead 
of that of the enforcing court. 
The international community seems to be split on the point. 
According to Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, the authors of the 
most authoritative text on international commercial arbitration in the 
European Continent, public policy under the New York Convention 
refers to international public policy, and not domestic public policy.26 
In a more recent commentary, it was claimed that enforcement states 
are, however, not obliged to consider supranational public policy when 
deciding to recognise or enforce an international arbitral award.27 The 
traditional common law view, although emphasising the public policy 
of the enforcement state, ie the English public policy, seems to favour 
a more balanced construction of Art V 2(b), when considering public 
policies between place of arbitration and place of enforcement. 
A leading English judgment in this area is Westacre Investments 
Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd.28 In this case, Westcare was to 
procure sales of Jugoimport military equipment in Kuwait. Jugoimport 
sought to repudiate the agreement and alleged that a military contract 
was illegal and contrary to public policy under Kuwait law, as it would 
have to involve bribing Kuwaiti offi cials. The case went to arbitration 
in Switzerland, and the tribunal disagreed on the public policy ground, 
granting an award to Westcare. Jugoimport sought to resist enforcement 
of the award in England. The English Court of Appeal held that even 
if this contract, being a contract of personal infl uence, was illegal in 
Kuwait law, as it was held, by the arbitration tribunal, to be not illegal, 
in the law of the place of arbitration and substantive law of the contract, 
which were both Swiss law. It would not offend English public policy 
either, as it was not against English public policy to enforce an award 
legally made in its arbitral seat which albeit involved elements infring-
ing the public policy of Kuwait. The underlying basis of the decision was 
that in English public policy, the public policy of international comity 
in enforcing validly made international arbitral awards outweighed the 
public policy of discouraging international commercial corruption.
26 E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman On International Commercial 
Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp 996–997.
27 James D. Fry, “Désordre Public International under the New York Convention: Wither Truly 
International Public Policy” (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 81.
28 Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1998] 4 All ER 570.
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The kind of public policy balancing envisaged by the Westcare case 
has signifi cantly referred to E D & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani Haryanto 
(No 2),29 in which Neill LJ said:
“The crucial question, as I see it, is whether, as a matter of English law, the 
public policy in favor of fi nality is overridden by some more important public 
policy based on the unenforceability of illegal contracts. I do not consider 
that this issue has been decided by the judgment of the District Court in 
Jakarta… The public policy invoked is a policy based on the rules of Indone-
sian domestic law. It is the English Court which must carry out the balancing 
exercise.”30
It appears that the English position on public policy involves a balance 
exercise. It is a balance between the importance of preventing a breach 
of public policy of the enforcement court using its domestic standards, 
with the importance of principle of pro-enforcement in international 
arbitration, before deciding whether to defer its judgment on the issue 
to the opinion of the supervising court. Although the public policy of 
the supervisory court should be paid due respect, according to Neill 
LJ, it is justifi ed for the enforcement court to consider a public policy 
which the supervising court has not considered. Then, if such a public 
policy is found to be of a greater importance than the principle of fi nality 
and comity, then the enforcement may be refused. But if enforcing the 
award in some way infringes the public policy of England, it has to be an 
infringement serious enough to outweigh England’s public policy of fi nal-
ity and comity in enforcing awards validly made at the arbitral seat. This 
cautious approach in the application of public policy ground has been 
well followed in the common law world. 
In one of its latest cases on arbitration, the Federal Court of Australia 
in Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry PVT Ltd (No 2)31 held that 
the expression public policy means those elements of the public policy 
of Australia which are so fundamental to the notions of justice that the 
courts of this country feel obliged to give effect to even in respect of 
claims which are based fundamentally on foreign elements. In coming 
to this conclusion, the Australian court quoted heavily from the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal (the “CFA”) judgment, Hebei Import and 
Export Corporation v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd.32 The Hebei case is one 
29 E D & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani Haryanto (No 2) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429.
30 Ibid., at 436.
31 Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry PVT Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 276 BC201201492.
32 See n 11 above.
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of those leading ones in interpreting “public policy” in the common law 
world and will be explained in subsequent discussions. 
III.2. Review of Public Policy in Hong Kong
Below is a chronological review of the cases in the past 20 years, in 
which public policy of enforcing a Mainland arbitral award has been a 
signifi cant issue.
Public policy issues began to concern Hong Kong courts before the 
reunifi cation. In Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd,33 the 
High Court of Hong Kong affi rmed refusal to recognise a CIETAC 
award on the ground that the respondent in the case was not allowed the 
opportunity to challenge the opinion of the expert witness appointed by 
the tribunal. Kaplan J held that no doubt a serious procedural irregular-
ity occurred and the party’s right to be heard was denied. Later, in Apex 
Tech Investment Ltd v Chuang's Development (China) Ltd,34 an appeal to 
challenge a CIETAC award was allowed by the Court of Appeal because 
the court found that the Hong Kong party in the proceeding was not 
given an opportunity to respond to an opinion issued by the local gov-
ernment bureau, which was taken by the tribunal as a decisive document 
in rendering the award. 
Before the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement entered into force on 
1 February 2000, the basis of Hong Kong’s stance on its public policy on 
enforcement of arbitral awards had been set up in early 1998, in the Court 
of Final Appeal case Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co 
Ltd.35 In the case, a CIETAC arbitral tribunal made an award in favour of 
the claimant, Hebei. The respondent, Polytek, applied unsuccessfully to 
the supervisory court in the Mainland to set aside the award. Hebei was 
granted leave to enforce the award in Hong Kong. Polytek then sought 
to resist enforcement at the Hong Kong court, on the ground that they 
were unable to properly present its case.36 The respondent complained 
that the presiding arbitrator and expert witness appointed by the tribu-
nal had inspected allegedly defective equipment at issue in the case, in 
the presence of the claimant’s technicians but not the respondents’. In 
association, the respondents did not receive proper notice of the inspec-
tion, were refused a further hearing subsequent to the inspection and 
33 [1993] 2 HKLR 39.
34 [1996] 2 HKLR 155.
35 [1998] 1 HKLRD 287.
36 This claim was made under s 44(2)(c) of the former Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341).
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were not allowed to call the manufacturer to give evidence on the fi nd-
ings of the report of the inspection. It was thus complained that the 
award was tainted by apparent bias and violated public policy of Hong 
Kong.37 Despite the fact that the supervising court in the Mainland, the 
Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, refused to entertain the respon-
dent’s complaints, the CA in Hong Kong ruled against enforcement of 
the award on the ground of public policy.38
The case went further to the CFA. The CFA unanimously allowed the 
appeal and demonstrated the pro-enforcement approach. It was found 
that the opportunity of a party to present his case and a determination by 
an impartial and independent tribunal are basic to the notions of justice 
and morality in Hong Kong.39 However, in determining whether what 
happened in the case was contrary to such notions, the CFA considered 
that the respondent had been given ample opportunity to deal with the 
expert’s report. Although it was said that the holding of the inspection 
at the end user’s factory and the presentation by the technicians in the 
absence of the respondent were procedures which in Hong Kong might 
be considered unacceptable, it was held that by inaction the respondent 
had waived his right to complain about the irregularity.40
On the point of waiver, the CFA held that refusal by a supervisory 
court at the seat of arbitration to set aside an award would not debar the 
party from resisting enforcement of the award in Hong Kong on the same 
ground, as public policy reason in a supervisory court may be different 
from a court of enforcement.41 The position would, however, be different 
if a party had failed to raise the challenge before the supervisory court; 
it would then be estopped from raising that point before the court of 
enforcement.42
The Hebei case is a leading authority, as the CFA has, for the fi rst time 
since the handover, dealt with public policy issues concerning Mainland 
arbitration practice with detailed explanations and guidance. Being a 
decision made before the conclusion of the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual 
Enforcement Arrangement, the CFA placed its emphasis on adherence 
to the fundamental principle of the New York Convention to encour-
age the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
awards in cross-border commercial transactions. Therefore, in fulfi lling 
that purpose, public policy as a legal device to safeguard the integrity of 
37 See n 36 above.
38 Ibid.
39 See n 11 above, per Bokhary PJ, at 122.
40 See n 11 above, per Bokhary PJ, at 123.
41 See n 11 above, per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, at 136.
42 See n 11 above, per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, at 139-140.
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the justice system of the enforcing jurisdiction should be given a narrow 
construction.43 Courts should also recognise the validity of decisions of 
foreign arbitral tribunals as a matter of comity, and give effect to them 
unless to do so would be against the forum court’s most basic notions of 
morality and justice.44 Litton PJ stated that public policy could only be 
grounded on extreme injustice.45 Quoting Bokhary PJ:
“In regard to the refusal of enforcement of awards on public policy grounds, 
there are references in the cases and texts to what has been called ‘interna-
tional public policy’. Does this mean some standard common to all civilized 
nations? Or does it mean those elements of a State’s own public policy which 
are so fundamental to its notions of justice that its courts feel obliged to 
apply the same not only to purely internal matters but even to matters with a 
foreign element by which other States are affected? I think that it should be 
taken to mean the latter…”46
Hence, an award to be denied must be so fundamentally offensive to 
that particular jurisdiction’s notion of justice.47 Sir Anthony Mason NPJ 
added his agreement with the opinion that the public policy could only 
be applied to the situation “contrary to the fundamental conceptions of 
morality and justice of Hong Kong”.48 In this regard, all the justices fi rmly 
took the same stand on the application criterion of public policy.49 It was 
generally believed that the pro-enforcement approach was well taken to 
face the new political reality of the reunifi cation. 
Less than two years later, the Hebei case was applied in Shanghai 
City Foundation Works Corp v Sunlink Ltd,50 and the case was handed 
down by Burrell J in the CFI. In the case, the defendant alleged that 
enforcement of an arbitral award should be refused, as there was an oral 
agreement between the parties providing that whatever the outcome of 
the arbitration, the settlement of the outstanding sums would only be 
payable after certain other conditions were fulfi lled. The court refused 
to withhold enforcement of the award to allow factual testimony as to 
the existence of the alleged agreement. Applying Hebei, it was held that 
the defendant’s failure to raise its challenge in the supervising court in 
43 Ibid.
44 See n 11 above, per Litton PJ, at 117-118.
45 See n 11 above, at 118.
46 See n 11 above, at 123.
47 See n 11 above, per Bokhary PJ at 122.
48 See n 11 above, per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ at 139.
49 In this case Li CJ and Ching PJ did not write their separate opinions, but agreed with 
Sir Anthony Mason NPJ on his judgment.
50 Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp v Sunlink Ltd [2001] 3 HKC 521.
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the Mainland amounted to an estoppel or a defeat of bona fi de such as to 
justify enforcement of the award.
In 2007, the CFA decided another case concerning public policy. 
In Unruh v Seeberger,51 it was alleged that a Mainland arbitral award 
should not be enforced because it was made in circumstances involving a 
champertous agreement, which was illegal in Hong Kong. Following the 
English approach in balancing public policy, it was held that it was 
improper for Hong Kong courts to impose its public policy against 
champerty on mature commercial parties who have chosen to arbitrate 
in a jurisdiction where champerty is not contrary to public policy. 
The role of the Hong Kong courts in enforcement actions is properly 
explained in Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd v Eton Properties Ltd in 2008.52 
In that case, the respondent applied to set aside leave to enforce an arbi-
tral award, claiming that it was impossible to perform a part of the award 
which imposed non-monetary obligations. It claimed that to enforce it 
would be against public policy, as it was fundamentally offensive to the 
court’s notion of justice to order it to perform the award, when the appli-
cant was not ready, willing or able to perform its obligations under the 
agreement. The case eventually reached the CA. However, it was at the 
CFI and through Reyes J that much analysis was given on the enforce-
ment policy of arbitral awards, and such analysis was agreed to in the 
CA. Reyes J accepted the counsel’s opinion at the CFI that in ensuring 
the effective and speedy enforcement of international arbitration awards, 
the court should play a “mechanistic role” when requested to enforce an 
arbitral award.
According to Reyes J, an enforcement court only has two tasks. 
First, it has to determine whether according to Art II of the New York 
Convention, it is a valid Convention award. Second, to determine 
whether the award may be refused under one of the exclusive grounds 
of refusal in Art V, in which public policy is one of such grounds. If the 
award is valid and there exists no valid ground to refuse enforcement, 
the award should be mechanistically enforced. The enforcement court 
needs not bother itself with the reasoning or circumstances in which 
the award was made. Hence, the court’s role should be “although by no 
means entirely ‘mechanistic’, ‘as mechanistic as possible’.”53
Consistent with the “mechanistic” principle, Reyes J held that unless 
an award was plainly incapable of performance, such that it would be 
obviously oppressive to order a party to comply with it, the court could 
51 (2007) 10 HKCFAR 31.
52 Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd v Eton Properties Ltd [2008] 4 HKLRD 972.
53 Ibid., at para 47.
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not hold that to enforce the award would be contrary to public policy. 
If it was merely arguable that the award was incapable of performance, 
it is incumbent on the parties that the issue be raised at the courts of 
supervision; it was held that it is not the place of enforcement courts “to 
go behind the award, explore the reasoning, and allow the re-opening 
of what the arbitrators had already decided”.54 If the issue was not raised 
at the courts of supervision, it was not for the courts of enforcement 
to second-guess how the courts of supervision might have decided. The 
Hong Kong judgment and the “mechanic” principle had quoted an ear-
lier English Court of Appeal judgment, C v D.55 The English Court held 
that an agreement as to the seat of arbitration is analogous to an exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for a remedy going to the validity of 
an existing interim or fi nal award is agreed to be made only in the courts 
of the place designated as to the seat of the arbitration. 
Reyes J made another important judgment on the issue of public policy 
in 2009. In A v R,56 the respondent sought to avoid an award against 
him, by claiming that the award was based on damages arising from a 
penalty clause, which was against public policy in Hong Kong. However, 
as the respondent did not even show up for the arbitration, applying 
the rule of estoppel in Hebei, the respondent was held to have waived 
his right to challenge the issue. Although a straightforward case in fact, 
the judgment has been well acclaimed in shedding light on why Hong 
Kong courts have traditionally been restrictive in interpreting the public 
policy exception. Reyes J held that the court must be vigilant that the 
public policy objection is not abused in order to obtain for the losing 
party a second chance at arguing a case. He found that to allow frivolous 
cases under public policy would undermine the effi cacy of the parties’ 
agreement to pursue arbitration. That by itself would not be conductive 
to the public good. 
It seems that the Hong Kong position on public policy, up to the A 
v R case, has been consistently in a cautious manner. The courts gener-
ally follow the narrow interpretation of the public policy,57 although, in 
the meantime, parties are reminded of the importance of raising proce-
dural objections at the place of arbitration in a timeously manner.58 As 
a line of the above cases shows, the Hong Kong courts respect the fact 
that when parties agree to arbitration, it is their intention that their dis-
pute be settled and argued by arbitration and not in court. Hence, any 
54 Ibid., at para 62.
55 C v D [2008] Lloyds Rep 239, at para 17.
56 A v R [2009] 3 HKLRD 389.
57 See Hebei, Unruh, Xiamen Xinjingdi Group, and Karaha Bodas cases. 
58 See Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp and A v R cases.
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error in judgment by arbitration would be insuffi cient to counterbalance 
the public policy of pro-enforcement, unless there is some substantial 
injustice to render the enforcement repugnant.
The next signifi cant case on the public policy in refusing an arbitral 
award is the Keeneye case. As illustrated before, the disparity in reasoning 
by the CA and the CFI is signifi cant, and it throws the interpretation of 
the standard of public policy to refuse enforcement of a foreign award 
in Hong Kong into confusion.59 This confusion is highlighted, as the 
CA has criticised Reyes J’s standard of viewing public policy, when, as 
we have seen above, much of the more recent case laws on the matter 
have been set by Reyes J. Therefore, the most recent judicial approach, 
as concerned in the new context of public policy regarding med-arb, has 
thrown a shroud of uncertainty over its authoritative value in the past 
two decades in Hong Kong.
IV. Public Policy Concerned in the New Context: Med-Arb
IV.1. The Relevance of Med-Arb
The issue of how the Hong Kong courts view the practice of med-arb in 
mainland China is highly important to parties who arbitrate in Greater 
China, as it is has been a very much relied on system. Inherited from 
the Confucian culture and Chinese legal traditions, mediation has been 
enjoying a prominent status in the Chinese dispute resolution system. 
The Arbitration Law of China (the “AL”) provides that if parties suggest 
mediation, the tribunal is obliged to conduct it.60 Arbitrators may act as 
mediators, and the outcome of a mediation so conducted by arbitra-
tors enjoys the legal effect as an award enforceable under the New York 
Convention.61 Hence, med-arb is not only the outstanding feature of 
arbitration of CIETAC, but also prevailing practice in all Chinese local 
arbitration commissions. Statistics show that in the period from 1983 
to 1988, about 50 percent of the CIETAC cases were settled through 
mediation by arbitrators; the fi gure maintained from 1989 to 2000.62 
These days CIETAC still enjoys a steadily successful rate of med-arb in 
the range of 20 to 30 percent.63
59 See discussions above in Section II of this article.
60 Article 51(1) of the AL.
61 Article 51(2) of the AL.
62 Source: CIETAC web site, http://cn.cietac.org/Mediation/index.asp?hangye=1 (visited 28 Aug 
2012).
63 Ibid.
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It is in this context that the  Keeneye  case raises new questions. It 
has been questioned whether the Mainland practice of med-arb is com-
patible with Hong Kong’s public policy. The usual med-arb practice in 
mainland China often does not meet the common law standards against 
apparent and actual bias, as well as the protection of confi dentiality and 
due process. When such a shortfall occurs in a Mainland med-arb, can 
such a shortfall ever be a valid ground to challenge an arbitral award in 
Hong Kong courts? In the Keeneye case, as previously discussed, neither 
the CFI nor the CA has ruled out such an argument, but they seem to 
have different standards on what factors should be looked at and what 
weight they should be given to, in deciding whether a public policy issue 
can be raised.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to lay out the theoretical framework 
of what med-arb is in the international context. The practice has not had 
a settled defi nition, having wider and narrower concepts. The narrower or 
the more internationally recognised concept refers to the situation when 
a party decides to employ the mediation process and arbitration process 
in a single case. The mediators and arbitrators shall be independent, and 
the mediation and arbitration proceedings shall operate independently.64 
However, a wider concept refers to any hybrid process where mediation 
is employed in the arbitration process. It does not matter whether the 
arbitral tribunal or an arbitrator takes over the mediation itself, or where 
an arbitrator plays a dual and often confl icting role of a mediator.65 
The wider or more loosely perceived concept of med-arb has become 
the concern of most of the Western world, most of them having res-
ervations of allowing arbitrators to act as mediators at the same time. 
Not surprisingly, as a result of his active involvement in both the media-
tion and arbitration phase of the process, the med-arbitrator loses his 
impartiality by becoming privy to confi dential information which would 
never have been disclosed to a pure arbitrator. This concern is further 
highlighted when private caucuses were used during the mediation 
stage. While discussing confi dential matters with the parties, it is pos-
sible that the med-arbitrator will become (consciously or unconsciously) 
empathetic towards one of the parties or otherwise involved with the 
subject matter.66 This may not be a problem while acting as a media-
tor, but when called on to make discretionary decisions as an unbiased 
64 See, Carlos de Vera, “Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med Arb’ and the Confl uence of Culture and 
Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China” (2004) 1(18) 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 155–157. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Barry C. Bartel, “Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and 
Potential” (1991) 3(27) Willamette Law Review 664, 685. 
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arbitrator, one can hardly ignore information disclosed. According to 
James Peter, it is diffi cult to believe that the med-arbitrator will remain 
unaffected as an arbitrator after engaging in caucuses and becoming privy 
to “confi dential, perhaps intimate, emotional, personal, or other ‘legally’ 
irrelevant information”.67
The controversy of the two concepts of med-arb has been partially 
fl eshed out by the Keeneye case. First, there is the issue of apparent bias 
which was alleged, when an arbitrator for the appellant and the Secretary 
General of the XAC pressurised a third party to push the respondents to 
agree to a RMB 250 million settlement, while the eventual arbitral award 
turned out to be of only RMB 50 million. Second, there is the problem of 
due process, which was brought about by the private caucus between the 
arbitrator, the Secretary General and the third party. Meetings as such 
are perceived dangerous in the common law settings, as involved parties 
are deprived the chance of rebutting anything said in the caucus which 
he may believe to be an inaccurate refl ection of his case. A third and 
related issue demonstrated by the Keeneye case is that arbitrators who act 
as mediators may unduly coerce parties into accepting their proposals, 
and that parties, for fear of being antagonised, may compromise in an 
unfavourable arbitration outcome.
IV.2. Recent Development of Med-Arb
Despite the problems mentioned above, med-arb is gaining track, not 
just in mainland China, but also in other parts of the world. This is 
mostly due to its case settlement effi ciency, as the arbitrator who was 
previously the mediator is already familiar with the case when mediation 
fails. Also, it saves costs. The practice may also produce more persuasive 
results for the parties, as the med-arbitrator understands more of the par-
ties’ concerns and will thus be able to make an award more in line with 
the interests of the parties, instead of parties’ pure legal rights. 
In Asia, med-arb is picking up popularity these days. This is possibly 
due to the fact that the rule of law tradition has historically not been as 
strong as in the West, and adjudicators have traditionally preferred to 
mediate the cases. Amongst others, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore have all made particular provisions on med-arb.68 
67 James T. Peter, “Med-Arb in International Arbitration” (1997) 8 American Review of International 
Arbitration 83, 91. 
68 Michael Pryles (ed), Dispute Resolution in Asia (Kluwer Law International, 3rd edn, 2006), 
pp 15–17.
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In the West, there has been a bit more resistance to allowing med-arb in 
the statutes, particularly in common law countries, where it is still a con-
troversial practice and the hybrid of which is considered to endanger due 
process. Some civil law countries have a rather different take on the issue. 
According to Kaufmann-Kohler, in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 
arbitrators have an active public and private duty to promote and facili-
tate settlement negotiations. She however stresses that it is not the same 
as mediation, but a form of “proactive managerial judging”, as unlike the 
mediator it is not the arbitrators “main remit” to settle the case, but only 
an “ancillary duty” to facilitate it.69 The situation is not the same in other 
civil law countries; as in France, arbitrators do not have such a duty, and 
therefore arbitrators have been much more reluctant to act as mediators 
of the same case.70
Although on the rising interest in the dispute resolution community, it 
seems that the legislative take on med-arb is fairly divided in the interna-
tional community. It would therefore be ideal to have some international 
legislation to offi cially clarify on the point, for example, whether to allow 
or disallow challenges to an award on the mere basis that an arbitra-
tor has acted in such a dual role as mediator. Unfortunately, the most 
recently revised Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is 
also silent on the issue,71 leaving the enforcement courts with the discre-
tion of deciding in each case with whether their public policy has been 
infringed by such practice.
In Hong Kong, the med-arb provisions can be found under ss 32 and 
33 of its most recently updated Arbitration Ordinance.72 Under the 
Ordinance, a member of an arbitral tribunal is permitted to serve as a 
mediator after arbitration proceedings have begun, provided that all par-
ties give their written consent.73 The Ordinance further provides that, in 
these circumstances, the proceedings are to be stayed in order to afford 
the mediation the maximum chance of success74—although if the medi-
ation fails, the arbitrator-mediator is required to disclose to all parties 
any confi dential information obtained during the mediation which he 
69 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a Transnational 
Standard” (2009) 2(25) Arbitration International 190.
70 Ibid.
71 The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, drafted by the United Nations 
Commission of International Trade Law (the “UNCITRAL”), comprises of a set of most widely 
accepted international arbitration norms. The Model Law has been most recently revised by 
UNCITRAL in 2006.
72 Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) was amended in 2010 and took effect on 1 June 
2011.
73 Section 33(1) of the Ordinance.
74 Section 33(2) of the Ordinance.
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considers to be material to the arbitral proceedings.75 Lastly, it is provided 
that no challenge can be made against an arbitrator solely on the ground 
that he has acted previously as a mediator in accordance.76 
The Hong Kong provision on med-arb is different from that of the 
Mainland. In Hong Kong, if mediation fails, the arbitrator-turned-
mediator is required to disclose to all parties any confi dential information 
obtained during the mediation which he considers to be material to the 
arbitral proceedings. This requirement is critical because it helps clear up 
the due process concerns of the common-law-trained Hong Kong legal 
professionals.77 Apart from difference on paper, more subtle disparities 
lie in practice, as driven by strong but contrasting legal systems, legal 
traditions and ideologies between Hong Kong and mainland China. As 
will be shown in Section V of the article, much of what Hong Kong and 
the common law world view as problems in the med-arb context, are, 
however, non-issues in the Mainland.
IV.3. Public Policy in the Context of Med-Arb
The Keeneye case has fl eshed out a new wave of discussions on public 
policy that the Hong Kong common law mindset has had against the 
Mainland style med-arb. The fi rst is on the issue of bias, the second is 
on due process and the third is on waiver, all relevant to the notion of 
“fundamental morality and justice” in Hong Kong. The three issues are 
intertwined with each other, to test whether a party has been deprived of 
legitimate rights to present and proceed with his case in arbitration, and 
this has pulled the alarm of the enforcement of the award and cross-border 
arbitral relation through the public policy ground.
To echo with earlier discussions, the problem of bias in the med-arb 
context is latent, as when an arbitrator becomes a mediator and then 
when mediation fails and he reverts back to the role of an arbitrator, he 
may lose his impartiality.78 The med-arbitrator becomes privy to infor-
mation not placed before the arbitral tribunal during the mediation and 
hence, he loses his impartiality as the arbitrator becomes attached to any 
settlement proposals he may have made or legal opinions he may have 
given during the mediation, and tries to prove himself right during the 
75 Section 33(4) of the Ordinance.
76 Section 33(5) of the Ordinance.
77 But in the meantime, the provision may deter some parties from engaging in frank discussions 
during the mediation, particularly during any caucus sessions, which may impede the effective-
ness of the design of the overall med-arb process.
78 See discussions in Section IV.1 of this article.
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arbitration. It is the combination of these factors which costs an arbitrator 
his impartiality. The common law arbitrators therefore tend to refuse to 
participate in med-arb, so that they can avoid appearing to be biased, 
even if they are confi dent that they can act professionally and adjudicate 
without bias.79 This point was the main thrust of the challenge of the 
award in the Keeneye case. 
At the CFI, Reyes J held that when the circumstances surrounding 
an arbitrator would cause a fair-minded observer to apprehend a real risk 
of bias,80 then an award made in that situation could be refused enforce-
ment under the public policy exception of Hong Kong.81 According to 
him, if an award were found to be tainted by the appearance of bias, the 
enforcement would be an affront to this court’s sense of justice.82 Reyes 
J, however, only cited A v R83 generally as authority for all the above 
points. That is a bit unfortunate, as A v R was a case he himself decided, 
and in that case he did not specifi cally deal with issues of bias or apparent 
bias. One of the main ratios of A v R was that Hong Kong’s public pol-
icy of enforcement, as a matter of comity, should be pro-enforcement.84 
Given that, it seems the theme of A v R does not seem to support Reyes 
J’s statement in the Keeneye case.
Fortunately, the point on apparent bias was picked up and has been 
further investigated in the CA. The CA found the Hebei case to be the 
defi nitive authority on the issue.85 Of particular importance on the issue 
of bias are the following two quotes which were referred to by Tang VP 
in the CA.
Bokhary PJ at page 124 of the Hebei case said: 
“Short of actual bias, I do not think that the Hong Kong courts would be 
justifi ed in refusing enforcement of a Convention award on public policy 
grounds as soon as appearances fall short of what we insist upon in regard to 
impartiality where domestic cases or arbitrations are concerned… After all, 
where the appearance of bias is strong enough, it can lead to an inference 
that actual bias existed.”86
79 Carlos de Vera, “Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med Arb’ and the Confl uence of Culture and Rule of 
Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China” (2004) 1(18) Columbia 
Journal of Asian Law 155–157.
80 See n 14 above, per Reyes J, at para 53.
81 Ibid., at para 69.
82 Ibid., at paras 99 and 100.
83 [2009] 3 HKLRD 389.
84 Ibid.
85 See n 12 above, per Tang VP, at para 49.
86 Ibid., at para 107.
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From this quote, it seems that only the fi nding of actual bias would be 
suffi cient to raise the public policy ground to resist the enforcement of 
the award. Following Bokhary PJ, Reyes J may have had erred to think 
otherwise.
In Hebei, however, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ at page 139 said: 
“The opportunity of a party to present his case and a determination by an 
impartial and independent tribunal which is not infl uenced, or seen to be 
infl uenced, by private communications are basic to the notions of justice and 
morality in Hong Kong.”87
Since the concept of “basic to the notions of justice and morality in 
Hong Kong” in the Hebei case has been held to be the most authoritative 
test of public policy exception in Hong Kong for refusal of enforcement 
of a foreign award, it seems that Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, different from 
Bokhary PJ's threshold, was saying that apparent bias could also be a 
ground under public policy to refuse enforcement. Despite the seemingly 
contrary views, Tang VP said that he could not see a confl ict between the 
views, that Bokhary PJ was merely pointing out that “one should not be 
too ready to refuse to enforce an award on the basis of one’s notion on 
what may amount to apparent bias”.88 
It seems that the current public policy of Hong Kong on apparent bias 
is as follows. What is normally considered apparent bias by Hong Kong 
courts, or in domestic arbitrations, is insuffi cient to constitute suffi cient 
grounds under public policy for the courts to refuse enforcement of a 
foreign award. For a foreign award to be refused enforcement under the 
ground of apparent bias, circumstances in the case must point towards 
very strong appearances of bias. Unfortunately, Tang VP has not con-
fi rmed whether Bokhary PJ's statement that if an appearance of bias is 
strong enough that actual bias can be inferred is an accurate refl ection of 
the court’s current threshold of refusing foreign awards under apparent 
bias. Fairly speaking, it is not that when an arbitrator acts as a mediator, 
he is already under suspicions of apparent bias, but it is reasonable to say 
that arbitrators acting as mediators are under conditions where it is easy 
to develop a bias.
The second associated problem with med-arb is its likely violation of 
due process. In one situation, if there is more than one arbitrator and they 
are not notifi ed of such additional information, the additional informa-
tion may affect the mind of one arbitrator and not the others, causing the 
87 Ibid., at para 109.
88 Ibid., at para 110.
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tribunal to decide on unbalanced grounds.89 In another situation, a viola-
tion of due process may occur, as the additional information obtained in 
the private caucus of mediation may affect the arbitrator’s mind without 
the other party having the right to question the validity and accuracy of 
what was said in the caucus.90 Internationally, the problems of these two 
situations are often solved by requiring the arbitrator who participated in 
the mediation to disclose all information which may be relevant to the 
issues, or for the mere purpose of recording a settlement reached during 
mediation, when arbitration resumes. For example, in Hong Kong, the 
Arbitration Ordinance requires arbitrators to disclose to all other parties 
all such confi dential information received by him in the role as a media-
tor if he considers the information material to the arbitral proceedings.91 
There are similar safeguards in Singapore. In Singapore, in relation to 
the dual-role dilemma whereas the mediator is concurrently appointed 
as the arbitrator, the Singapore Mediation Center Mediation Procedure 
requires that the arbitrator’s appointment is merely “nominal”, and is 
“solely for the purpose of recording any settlement reached as a result of 
the mediation as a consensual arbitral award”.92
Unfortunately, the situation is far from satisfactory in mainland China. 
The 1994 Arbitration Law only provides sweep reference to the practice 
of med-arb.93 The Law contains no provisions disallowing private meet-
ings (caucus), nor are there any provisions requiring arbitrators to dis-
close information obtained from such meetings to other parties or to the 
rest of the tribunal. The Law is further silent on whether arbitrators are 
restricted from using their knowledge of such information when decid-
ing the case afterwards and many mainland Chinese med-arbitrators are 
found to have heavily relied on these information in making the award. 
Hence, the difference in legislative policy the two jurisdictions have 
towards the maintenance of due process is outstanding where mainland 
Chinese awards are transferred to Hong Kong seeking enforcement. 
The third associated problem concerns waiver, and the argument of 
waiver may counteract all endeavours made for a public policy exception 
resisting enforcement. As stated in earlier part of the article, the respon-
dents had, before coming to Hong Kong courts, unsuccessfully sought 
89 Carlos de Vera, “Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med Arb’ and the Confl uence of Culture and Rule of 
Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China” (2004) 1(18) Columbia 
Journal of Asian Law 155–157.
90 Ibid.
91 Section 33(4) of the Ordinance.
92 Article 6 of the Singapore Mediation Center Mediation Procedure.
93 Article 51 of the AL only provides that if parties suggest mediation, the tribunal is obliged to 
conduct it.
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the setting aside of the arbitral award by the supervising court (Xi’an 
Intermediate Court).94 In response to an argument by the applicants that 
the respondents were estopped in Hong Kong from raising on enforce-
ment a public policy point on which they had failed before a court of the 
arbitral seat, the CA held, following principles established in Hebei, that 
a party which unsuccessfully challenges an award before the supervisory 
court is not precluded from raising the same ground before the enforcing 
court because the latter’s public policy may well differ from that of the 
former.95
Reyes J in the CFI considered that there had been no waiver on the 
respondents’ part in not having complained to the Xi’an court about 
what had happened at the dinner meeting. Tang VP in the CA concurred 
with Reyes J that no estoppel arose from the decision of the supervisory 
court.96 The CA was, however, concerned that the refusal of a supervi-
sory court to set aside an award on the ground of apparent bias could lead 
to injustice as such refusal was relevant to the enforcing court’s decision. 
In support of that proposition, the English authority Minmetals Germany 
GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd97 was cited,98 where Coleman J said:
“… In international commerce a party who contracts into an agreement to 
arbitrate in a foreign jurisdiction is bound not only by the local arbitration 
procedure but also by the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of 
the arbitration… That is because by his agreement to the place in question 
as the seat of the arbitration he has agreed not only to refer all disputes to 
arbitration but that the conduct of the arbitration should be subject to that 
particular supervisory jurisdiction.”99 
Coleman J explained that it was a cardinal English public policy to 
respect that agreement, so that parties aggrieved by defects to an arbitra-
tion or its award are obligated to fi rst pursue such remedies as exist under 
that supervisory jurisdiction. In the case where the remedy for an alleged 
defect is applied for in the supervisory court but is refused, it will normally 
require very strong public policy considerations before the English court 
will overturn the decision of the supervising courts. Coleman J went on 
94 See discussions in Section II of this article.
95 See n 11 above, per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ at 140.
96 See n 12 above, per Tang VP, at para 66.
97 Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] CLC 647. (Queen’s Bench Commercial 
Court, England and Wales).
98 See n 12 above, per Tang VP, at para 67.
99 See Minmetals , n 98 above, per Coleman J, at 661, cited in Keeneye, n 12 above, per Tang VP, 
at para 67.
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to explain that in exceptional cases, however, such as in cases involving 
corruption, so that the supervising courts could not effectively review 
the irregularity in the case, the English courts may then come to their 
own decision without deference to the conclusion made by the supervis-
ing courts. Outside such exceptional cases, any allegations of substantial 
injustice in the conduct of arbitration that have already been considered 
by the supervisory court seeking re-investigation at the enforcement 
court- (English court) - is to be mostly strongly deprecated.100
Tang VP went on to say that deference should be paid to supervisory 
court and hence, blamed Reyes J for not having placed enough weight on 
the decision of the Xi’an Court.101 Tang VP considered that the enforce-
ment court must take into account the difference in mediation culture 
and practice between Hong Kong and mainland China. Thus guided, 
a Mainland court is better able to decide whether mediation by way of 
a dinner meeting in a hotel would be acceptable in mainland China, 
where the court saw no bias and no complaint about the venue had been 
made to the Xi’an Court.102 After considering the facts, the CA held that 
no apparent or actual bias had been established that would entitle the 
respondents to refusal of enforcement, and the respondents had clearly 
waived their right to complain what happened in the hotel and, on this 
basis, the appeal was allowed.103 
It may be true that in light of the principle of international comity 
and respect of the agreement of the parties’ choice of the supervisory 
jurisdiction, the award should have been enforced. Nonetheless, it can-
not be the case that Hong Kong courts should defer to the opinion of 
the supervising courts without fi rst balancing the above pro-enforcement 
policies against Hong Kong’s public policy of requiring arbitrations to be 
free from bias and be in due process. If the public policy of the enforce-
ment court is not to be balanced against the policy of deferring to the 
opinion of the supervisory court, and deference is automatic in all but the 
most exceptional situations such as corruption, then the public policy 
exception of allowing enforcement courts to refuse awards according to 
its own public policy would be emasculated.
As discussed in earlier part of this article, established in Westcare 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport104 and E D & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani 
Haryanto (No 2),105 under English law, there has to be a balance test 
100 Ibid., cited in Keeneye, n 12 above, per Tang VP, at para 67.
101 See n 12 above, per Tang VP, at para 68.
102 Ibid., at para 99.
103 Ibid., at para 69.
104 See n 29 above.
105 See n 30 above. 
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before deciding whether to defer its judgment on the issue to the opinion 
of the supervising court.106 This point, if applied to the Keeneye case, 
could lead it to a different result. It could be argued that Tang VP too 
readily deferred his opinion to the court of supervision (ie the Xi’an 
Intermediate Court). Although it may be justifi ed that it is against the 
principle of fi nality to re-open the case under the point of actual bias, 
it may have been more appropriate to conduct the above balancing 
test between the importance placed on the principle of fi nality and the 
public policy of enforcing awards made in circumstances of apparent 
bias, before deciding whether to defer the court’s opinion to that of the 
supervising court. 
Applying the English approach, it seems that the CFI and CA have 
both gone too far in opposite directions. The CFI has too stringently 
applied a Hong Kong standard of public policy which may open the 
fl oodgates to parties resisting enforcement of Mainland awards which do 
not conform strictly to Hong Kong standards on bias and due process, 
and the arbitral tribunal may not even have in mind when making the 
award. On the other hand, the CA may have too readily deferred its 
opinion of the enforceability of an award to the supervising court without 
consideration and balancing of the relevant issues of Hong Kong policy 
against the policy of pro-enforcement. It is proposed that the appropriate 
approach towards public policy should lie in the middle.
What does the Keeneye case mean for parties who are seeking 
enforcement of arbitral awards in Hong Kong? It seems that in assessing 
public policy, the most recent Hong Kong approach is that an enforce-
ment court (ie the Hong Kong court) is entitled to consider the ques-
tion of bias from its own view point. But when it comes to facts, due 
regard should be given to the views of supervisory courts. In considering 
the refusal of enforcement on public policy ground, waiver is also a bal-
ancing factor. The current position, although challenged as not cautious 
enough after comparison with the English approach, has transmitted 
a clear message that the public policy consideration should be leaning 
towards the perspective of the supervisory court.
V. Implication of Keeneye in Cross-border Arbitral Relations
What can parties expect of Hong Kong courts on public policy issues 
in treating Mainland arbitral awards after the Keeneye case? As the 
106 See discussions in Section III.1 of this article, particularly regarding the English approach. 
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elaboration goes, there are a number of implications that we can draw 
from Keeneye in cross-border arbitral relations. 
First, the Keeneye case has highlighted two confl icts which may cause 
confusion in the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards. On the 
one hand, the case reveals a disagreement between Hong Kong courts in 
the relative weight they should place on the pro-enforcement policies of 
comity and fi nality and whether the courts should defer their opinion on 
the enforceability of an award when the supervisory court’s public policy 
is substantially different from what the Hong Kong courts apply. As has 
been analysed, this confl ict is highly undesirable and makes it diffi cult 
for parties to anticipate an outcome of challenges made on the public 
policy ground. On the other hand, there is the more subtle legal confl ict 
between the two jurisdictions. The confl ict has long been known to both 
sides, as Hong Kong and mainland China have had different legal histo-
ries and have been driven by different sets of legal systems and ideologies. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Hong Kong has been back to China’s sov-
ereign power for over 15 years, the confl icts outlined above are predicted 
to continue in cases where courts from both jurisdictions are involved.
The second confl ict delineated by the Keeneye case does not stop there, 
and can be found in many earlier cases, such as in the Hebei case (where 
the Mainland courts were found to have less respect for the importance 
of due process), and in Unruh v Seeberger (where the Mainland side has 
no qualms about champertous agreements). In the particular scenario 
of med-arb, the implications by Keeneye are more serious with respect 
to Mainland med-arb awards than to New York Convention awards, 
not only as the process will arise more frequently in the former context, 
but also there are less procedural safeguards accorded to parties. Hence, 
the Keeneye case bears strong infl uence in the far-reaching Hong Kong-
Mainland cross-border arbitral relations. For parties involved in cross-
border business transactions, they need to do research on the public pol-
icy relevant to their contract in question and their arbitration agreement, 
paying attention not only to the usual policies of the supervisory court, 
but also that of the enforcement court.
The Keeneye case also indicates that the level of standard of pub-
lic policy in the cross-border enforcement might be somewhat 
China-oriented, or comparatively lower than what is applied to the New 
York Convention. Pursuant to Keeneye, because both parties involved 
in the arbitration come from mainland China and the Chinese court 
has interpreted the legality of the case, it would thus be undesirable for 
Hong Kong courts to read into the mind of mainland Chinese judges, 
unless the issues threaten the fundamental justice and morality in Hong 
Kong. The legal issues such as bias and due process concerned in med-
arb procedures, although challenged as problems in Hong Kong (at least 
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in its domestic arbitration), have, however, been taken for granted and 
never been considered as problems in the Mainland. Hence, the public 
policy ground that should be narrowly construed and cautiously applied 
in Hong Kong may not be able to deal with all procedural violations and 
impartiality issues in the Mainland as a developing legal system under 
the cross-border regime. Regardless of legal terms and technical grounds, 
the real concern behind all the worries seems to be the quality and com-
petence of the arbitral award of the Mainland, particularly when the 
awards are made by the government-affi liated local arbitration commis-
sions that have taken shape only after the Arbitration Law was put into 
practice in 1995.107 
From the Hong Kong side, it might be argued that a more sensible 
understanding is needed for a healthy development of cross-border arbi-
tral relations. As what has been refl ected in Keeneye, Tang VP at the 
CA, when considering the properness of med-arb, asked the panel to pay 
regard to how mediation was normally conducted in the jurisdiction of 
the supervisory court (ie whether mediation by way of a dinner meeting 
in a hotel with “work on” by other parties would be acceptable in the 
Mainland). Although the CA judgment, as we see the analysis in the 
previous discussions, has been challenged as deviating from the Hong 
Kong usual level of standard, the allow of the appeal did indicate a sig-
nal of such understanding by the Hong Kong judiciary of the status quo 
of the Mainland on legal aspects. In the long run, the Mainland side is 
expected to pick up on the legal aspects. Otherwise, the legal as well as 
ideological gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland will continue to 
be sources of confl ict and misunderstanding in cases where courts from 
both jurisdictions are involved, and the considerable differences between 
the two regions will become an insurmountable barrier to cross-border 
judicial cooperation.
Notwithstanding the gap and confl ict, in the meantime, the fact that 
Hong Kong and the Mainland have been able to maintain a fl ourish-
ing cross-border arbitration system through the Arrangement is a laud-
able feat. Moreover, the Arrangement has been well implemented by 
the very pro-arbitration judiciary at the Hong Kong side.108 The smooth 
development of the cross-border arbitration scheme is valuable to the 
legal professions in both jurisdictions and to the health of cross-border 
107 For a brief account of the development of local arbitration commissions in mainland China, 
see Gu Weixia, Arbitration in China: The Regulation of Arbitration Agreements and Practical Issues 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), Ch 6.
108 Gu Weixia, “Recourse against Arbitral Awards: How Far Can a Court Go? Supportive and 
Supervisory Role of Hong Kong Courts as Lessons to Mainland China Arbitration” (2005) 2(4) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 481–500.
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transactions and businesses. Therefore, whenever a mainland Chinese 
arbitral award is criticised by a Hong Kong court, the Mainland side 
pays attention and takes action, so that it can be aware of the health 
conditions of its own arbitration system which the Mainland values in 
the process of its deepening marketisation.
The Keeneye case, ever since the publishing of its fi rst round judg-
ment (at the CFI), has received much academic attention in the 
Mainland.109 The arbitration community is also taking active actions. 
Of particular note, on 1 May 2012, CIETAC implemented a new set of 
arbitration rules (the “2012 CIETAC Rules”),110 in which some partic-
ular reforms were made to the med-arb practice. To allay the concerns 
on independence and impartiality of mediator and arbitrator assumed 
by the same person, the 2012 Rules now provide for a CIETAC-assisted 
mediation process not to be carried out by the arbitral tribunal under 
Art 45(8).111 As some practitioners comment on the revision, the latest 
CIETAC reform refl ects a quick response to the Keeneye case (particu-
larly regarding some of the criticisms made by Reyes J), and to a certain 
extent mirrors the approach of having accredited mediators to serve 
the med-arb process which recently took place under the Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Center.112 The quick response by CIETAC 
to Keeneye echoes with its previous reform in 2000 following an award 
turned down by Hong Kong courts (the Hebei case).113 Hence, although 
the Keeneye case may have, on the one hand, lowered the predictability 
of outcome in cases which involve a cross-border clash in legal system 
and ideology in the enforcement of arbitral awards, it has simultane-
ously acted as a catalyst in improving the arbitration system in the 
Mainland. The attention which the Mainland is paying to the stan-
dard of the Hong Kong courts is a most encouraging phenomenon. It is 
hoped that this attention will increase in time, leading to more reforms 
in arbitration system in the Mainland, pulling together the legal schism 
between the two jurisdictions in Greater China.
Finally, as the med-arb system is quite popular worldwide, both 
Hong Kong and the Mainland should let go of its fear of the system so 
109 Fan Kun, “The Risks of Apparent Bias When an Arbitrator Act as a Mediator: Remarks on 
Hong Kong Court’s Decision in Gao Haiyan” (in Chinese), (2011) 13 China Yearbook of Private 
International Law 535–556. 
110 CIETAC has historically revised its rules on seven occasions, in 1988, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
2005 and 2012 respectively. The most recent CIETAC Rules were revised on 3 Feb 2012, effec-
tive as from 1 May 2012, available at the CIETAC web site http://www.cietac.org/index.cms.
111 Article 45(8), 2012 CIETAC Rules.
112 Allen & Overy, “CIETAC in 2012 – a year of change and challenges”, on fi le with author.
113 Gu Weixia, “Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Lessons and Convergence between Two 
Jurisdictions in China” (in Chinese), (2009) 4 Jurists 106–117. 
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as to achieve a more credible cross-border enforcement arena. The crux 
is to adopt med-arb with proper safeguards. One of the plausible ways to 
prevent a med-arb award from being challenged is to have the parties 
engage in a procedural conference, so they can agree on the detailed 
format of how the med-arb will be proceeded with, and decide on issues 
whether private caucuses will be permissible. The arbitrator must also set 
a very high standard of his own professionalism. When making propos-
als to settlements, he must be careful not to pressurise the parties, or be 
assertive. In order to avoid appearing to be biased, he must avoid private 
caucuses unless necessary. If he unilaterally comes across information 
relevant to the case, he must disclose such information to all parties to 
protect their rights of due process. If the mediation fails and arbitration 
is proceeded with, he must remind himself that his role has changed, 
and only consider information placed before the tribunal, and not con-
sider information he obtained which are irrelevant to the issues in the 
case. If an arbitrator can carry out a med-arb with such professional 
standards, it is hard to envision a situation how an award thus made may 
be refused enforcement in any court under the public policy exception. 
To encourage the proliferation of such best practices, it is hoped that 
arbitration institutions in both Hong Kong and the Mainland will cre-
ate enforceable guidelines for their arbitrators to follow when engaging 
in med-arb practice, thus creating an unimpeachable med-arb system 
which awards will be unassailable in both jurisdictions.
VI. Conclusion
From the practical perspective, the decision of the CA on Keeneye 
should be welcomed as the case law representing the latest development 
of cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards under the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement. The Keeneye decision not only consistently follows 
the pro-enforcement stance of the Hong Kong judiciary in dealing with 
set aside challenges, but also extends the jurisprudence into med-arb 
context as an emerging practice area gaining increasing importance. 
The judgment will provide both Mainland and Hong Kong practitioners 
with useful guidelines in dealing with new issues and concerns arising 
out of the med-arb proceedings. Moreover, institutionally, the discussion 
involved in the judgments at the two levels of the Hong Kong courts 
will be conducive for further improving the rules and practice of med-arb 
procedures, in both mainland China and Hong Kong.
From the academic point of view, Hong Kong’s closer economic rela-
tionship with the Mainland and rapid development of med-arb practice 
at both sides will demand further research on some controversial issues 
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left out by Keeneye. For example, how to determine the test to which 
apparent bias and effective waiver can be found for relying upon the pub-
lic policy exception in arbitration in Hong Kong. And how far the weight 
should be given to the decision of the Mainland supervising court in pub-
lic policy review by the Hong Kong enforcement court. Even after unifi -
cation for more than 15 years, the legal, cultural and ideological confl icts 
between the two sides as refl ected in Keeneye are still outstanding. The 
common expression of “work on” and practice to involve third party for 
infl uence played an interesting role in the Keeneye case and led to differ-
ent judgments at the Mainland and Hong Kong sides, as well as dispar-
ity rulings at the two levels of courts in Hong Kong. Reyes J at the CFI 
found apparent bias with the apprehension of “a fair minded observer (in 
Hong Kong)”114 whereas Tang VP at the CA based his judgment more on 
“an understanding of how mediation is normally conducted in the place 
where it was conducted”.115 As the Keeneye ruling shows, despite the dis-
agreement between the two levels of Hong Kong courts in the relative 
weight they should place on the pro-enforcement policy and deference to 
pay to the supervisory court, the different legal practices in Hong Kong 
and mainland China may cause much uncertainty in the cross-border 
arbitration. But the future is not without hopes. Although Keeneye may 
have, on the one hand, lowered the predictability of outcome in cases 
which involve a cross-border clash in ideology in the enforcement of arbi-
tral awards, it has simultaneously acted as a catalyst in reducing such dif-
ferences, as seen from the rapid Mainland reform to the rules on med-arb.
To conclude, the Keeneye case has once again reminded the legal com-
munity of the diffi culties and uncertainties in public policy application in 
arbitration. In the particular context of cross-border arbitration between 
mainland China and Hong Kong, it is perceived that the application 
of public policy will continue to be challenged by novel issues arising 
more at the Mainland side as a developing legal jurisdiction. As argued, 
a potentially more credible Chinese arbitration system is expected to be 
built upon and in the course of its improvement, understanding from 
the Hong Kong side will be helpful for the healthy development of a 
cross-border arbitration scheme. 
114 See n 14 above, at para 53.
115 See n 12 above, at para 102.
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